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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the objectives of the Voyager mission is to  evaluate the surfaces and environments 
of Mars and Venus in order to obtain information about the origins of life. Since Mars 
appears to offer an environment which is conducive to the evolution of life as we know it, 
this Mars  mission has received intense attention of leading scientists. There is no ques- 
tion that the decision to accomplish atmospheric penetration and landing on sister planets 
is inseparable from the effectiveness with which it can be assured that there will be no 
contamination by terrestrial organisms. 
The objectives and reasons for rigid sterilization requirements have been outlined by 
many authors (References 1, 2, 3 and 4). Hobby(4) has advocated, as a design require- 
ment, a probability of 1 x 10-4 that must not be exceeded of landing a viable terrestr ia l  
organism on the target surface. Agreement that contamination of the target must not be 
permitted is virtually unanimous among those planning the scientific objective of the 
miss  ion. 
Therefore,apositive requirement for the Voyager system, as set  forth by NASA at the 
beginning of the study, is that the probability of contaminating Mars with terrestr ia l  
organisms be less than one chance in ten thousand and for Venus one chance in ten. 
V i r u s e s  have not been considered inasmuch as viruses can reproduce only in specific 
types of living cells. Accordingly, i f  earth-type organisms are exluded, then viruses will 
not reproduce. However, to achieve the 1 x probability of contamination, it is not 
immediately apparent whether an advance in the state of the art is required. 
Sterilization must be planned to  assure  the required reliability and, hence, the success 
of the total mission. Biological research has shown that the most reliable technique for 
accomplishing total vehicle sterilization is a suitable thermal treatment, at some prac- 
tical level attainable by engineering practice. 
should remain as back-up or as secondary methods. Gases and liquids present an attrac- 
tive approach for some component problems but sterilization by these methods affords no 
guarantee of an aseptic vehicle. 
The use of gaseous and liquid sterilants 
Another technique, treatment by radiation, presents engineering and component problems 
that appear unsolvable at present. Levels of radiation lethal to the majority of micro- 
organisms a r e  approximately equal t o  those that jeopardize the performance and reliability 
of vital components. Accordingly, radiation sterilization at present must be limited to 
selected components. Even this limited use assumes steri le assembly of these parts. 
Jaffee(1) has discussed current techniques of steri le assembly intended for planetary 
spacecraft, and indicates that they are not likely to comply with the required 1 x 
probability of contamination. However, radiation may be useful for reducing the "biological 
load. " 
and lower radiation levels might be a feasible solution to the sterilization problem. 
Koesterer (5) has suggested that a combined treatment a t  reduced heat levels 
This study has considered primarily tine Mars 1959 Lmder  mission but an analysis of the 
sterilization problems of the Mars 1973 Orbiter is given in the Appendix. 
temperatures forecast for  Venusian atmospheres indicate that the sterility standards for  
Mars  and techniques for achieving them will be satisfactory for Venus. 
The extreme 
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SECTION 2. SUMMARY 
2.1 REQUIRE ME NTS 
It is required t b t  the chance of releasing a viable microorganism on the planet target 
shall be 1 x 10-4. Only the Lander will be considered since the probability of the Lander 
striking the target is assumed t o  be unity. The trajectory of the Orbiter will be such as 
to  present less than 1 x 10-4 probability of planetary impact. 
Sterilization will be accomplished by thermal means. The use  of ethylene oxide, as well 
as other gaseous and liquid sterilants, will be restricted to "biological load" reduction or  
other secondary uses. 
Inasmuch as steri le assembly is considered t o  present more than a 1 x 
organism survival, equipment, parts,  components and structures wi l l  be heated as a 
terminal measure for a t  least 24 hours to 135OC. Sterile assembly wi l l  be limited to parts,  
components, and structures that inherently cannot be heated to 145OC for three cycles of 
36 hours. This latter temperature requirement is considered to be a qualification require- 
ment. For qualification, parts,  components, and structure must show the required func- 
tional reliability (to be established for each mission) after a prescribed dormant period 
following thermal cycling. 
probability of 
All  components, parts,  and structures,  from the time of preliminary design, wi l l  be 
classified as Class I, Class I1 or Class 111. Class I items can withstand at least three 
145OC, 36 hour cycles. They may, but not necessarily will,  withstand further temperature 
soakings. However, these items may present problems related to  the "biological load" 
factors. Class I1 items will withstand only one thermal treatment: 135OC for 24 hours. 
An item may be a Class I1 item due to sensitivity in respect to reliability questions. 
Class I11 items wil l  not withstand thermal cycling at  prescribed sterilization temperatures. 
An objective of the design program will be to  eliminate all Class I11 and as many Class I1 
items as possible from the flight hardware. 
The three classes may be further subdivided. 
sterilization treatment requires,  from manufacture on, that each par t ,  structure, and 
component will be subjected to  the maximum sterilization environment without regard to 
the general sorting and classification of individual parts. 
The basic philosophy of maximum practical 
Known high-reliability par ts  were carefully examined for thermal sensitivity. These par ts  
and materials constitute the basic list for design engineers. The parts,  assemblies, and 
sub-assemblies chosen for flight hardware will be qualified to  both reliability and sterility 
standards, Where functions exist that cannot be performed by a space-qualified component, 
such functions may be omitted from the flight. Where mission success depends on a non- 
thermally qualifiable com onent, the item will be assembled by steri le techniques that wi l l  
insure less  than a 1 x IO-g probability of contamination. The 24-hour final heat soak will 
continue to  be a requirement for Class 11 iterns to assure  the 1 x standard. 
Class I11 items are not expected to be a part  of the final flight hardware. The appearance 
of a Class I11 item in the final design wil l  constitute a serious problem to be solved only by 
detailed examination of that specific part and function. 
2.2 PROCEDURE, PROCESSES, AND DESIGN APPROVALS 
Clean room requirements for the Voyager program a r e  concluded to  be Class 10,000 or 
less. 
During testing of the assembled vehicle, this requirement may be met by conducting the 
entire testing cycle within a pliable plastic container or biological barrier.  It is not 
anticipated that clean rooms or containers wi l l  be sterile, nor wi l l  sterility be sought. 
This manufacturing requirement is regarded as absolute. 
2-1 
During the testing cycles, the sealed portions of par ts  and components will not be com- 
promised, and thus sterility problems wil l  be limited to  outer-surface areas. The final 
thermal treatment before sealing the protective flight container will steri l ize these 
surfaces . 
- 
Class II and Class III spares and components, destined for assembly, require protection 
of a special kind; soil contamination must be prevented as well as loss of sterility. Con- 
tainers or  biological barriers, designed to  protect the items fdnctionally, must include 
provision for maintenance of sterility and cleanliness. 
A Sterility Contamination Control Group should review each design item. Each final 
machine assembly drawing wil l  be approved and signed by a member of this group. Design 
i tems will be checked for sterility interfaces, material  compatibility, manufacturing pro- 
cesses  and final packaging. During the assembly phase, as well as the manufacturing 
phase, cri t ical  steps and processes will be monitored and approved by a trained sterility 
inspector. 
2.3 VERIFICATION 
It is not practical within the scope of this study to assay flight equipment. The adoption of 
a satisfactory method for sterilization, followed by a strict  adherence to the systematic 
method from manufacture through launch, is required to achieve 1 x 10-4 probability of a 
steri le vehicle. 
At the t ime of equipment selection and qualification, selected components wi l l  be "seeded" 
during the manufacturing cycle. The "seeding" will utilize an organism resistant to thermal 
and gaseous sterilization. A microbiological assaywill be conducted on these components and 
parts,  after t r ia l  assembly runs and sterilization tes ts ,  to verify the efficacy of the pre- 
scribed sterilization procedure. 
2.4 PRODUCTION 
The sterility program requires a minimum of clean room assembly for all components. 
Class I1 and I11 par ts  and components require steri le assembly to  ensure a less than 1 x 
10-2 probability of contamination. Each step of the manufacturing and assembly process 
wi l l  be monitored. Random samples of component par ts  wi l l  be selected, throughout the 
manufacturing and production phase, and subjected to biological assay techniques. A 
rigorous personnel training and motivation program wil l  be required. 
Each step of the manufacturing process will  be analyzed for sterility breaks. 
transporting, and 
minute attention to detail are the best assurance of a steri le end product. 
Packaging, 
storaging operations represent a reas  where detailed procedures and 
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SECTION 3. ANALYSES 
3.1 DISCUSSION 
The guidelines prepared by the Conference on Spacecraft Sterility(2) held under the aus- 
pices of NASA Biosciences Programs, 9 July 1962, has been adopted as the foundation 
of this study. A functionally reliable, biologically steri le spacecraft is the objective 
established by the guidelines. 
Components and materials have been reviewed and screened for early identification of 
sterilization problems. The concept of "reducing the organism and dirt  load" at  all possi- 
ble steps in the factory-to-launch sequence has been projected into the design manufacturing 
and handling sequences. 
A complete thermal sterilization, at 135OC for twenty-four hours, of the fully assembled 
and tested spacecraft has been the design goal. It is believed that this goal can only be 
re2ched by close control of the entire component and test, design and manufacturing 
process. K ~ e s t e r e r ( ~ )  has reported that microorganisms in ordinary soil are the most 
difficult t o  destroy; thus, the control of soil and dust contamination at  every point becomes 
of paramount importance. 
and within the Lander, requires ultra-clean room assembly throughout. (The alternative, 
cleaning each part  and the space vehicle, is not considered a feasible solution either from 
a technical or an economical point of view. ) Clean room assembly of all parts,  components, 
and structure, as well as clean room testing, has been specified. 
Standards of clean rooms a r e  Class 100, Class 10,000, and Class 100,000. These 
standards have not yet been adopted, but it is felt that clean room assembly and test  
requirements of Class 10,000 wil l  not impose unreasonable requirements if laminar air- 
flow equipment is utilized. The selection of Class 100 is not considered advisable inas- 
much as the mere presence of the human assemblers and tes ters  would preclude practical 
realization of this figure. 
To achieve a level of no more than two grams of soil@), on 
Proposed Federal 
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-3.2 CLASSIFICATION 
The interior portions of many structural materials a r e  inherently steri le because of the 
nature of their manufacturing process (high temperature over substantial periods of time). 
However, inasmuch as only a small  proportion of the par ts  to  be considered fall in the 
inherently sterile category, it has become necessary to subdivide components into three 
general classifications: Classes I, 11, and III. 
Class I consists of i tems that do not suffer functional damage as result of heat soak. 
These items can be fully qualified at 145OC for 36 hours, and tolerate ethylene oxide 
sterilization procedures. They may, if required, be reused in vehicles that suffer loss 
of steri le integrity and go through recycle procedures. Items in this group further have 
been demonstrated to withstand the simulated full mission profile including space vacuum 
and planetary surface conditions following a full sterilization cycle. (6) 
Class I1 consists of items that have a temperature ceiling of 135OC. Items of this group 
do not tolerate qualification temperature cycles unequivocally but may be further sub- 
divided into two categories: those i tems that should be exposed to terminal sterilization 
only once and those i tems that may be recycled. 
Class I11 consists of parts and assemblies that cannot withstand thermal sterilization. 
Resolution of the par ts  selection problem in this class must be achieved prior to finali- 
zation of spacecraft and/or Lander design. 
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3 .3  MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY 
3 .3 .1  CLASS I ITEMS 
Class I items are to be manufactured in clean rooms. Transportation will be made in 
dust- and soil-proof containers. Initial thermal sterilization will occur a t  the earliest 
possible time. 
load. Surface sterilization wil l  occur at each step into a higher assembly. It is expected 
that gaseous sterilization of component containers wil l  suffice inasmuch as each component 
would be internally steri le and only surface contamination would occur. 
3 .3 .2  CLASS I1 ITEMS 
Primary purpose of this sterilization step wi l l  be to  reduce the organism 
Class I1 items, the minimum grade parts tolerable for the initial Voyager spacecraft, 
wil l  be assembled in a clean room or sterile chamber as required and containerized in the 
in the requisite contamination barrier.  They wi l l  be subjected to  surface sterilization by 
ethylene oxide as they a r e  built into higher assemblies. hlodularization wi l l  be functional 
and designed to  prevent internal contamination. 
3 .3 .3  CLASS I11 ITEMS 
While Class I11 parts  shall not be planned as a part of the Voyager design, a discussion is 
included in the event that highly important experiments may have to be handled in this 
manner. Class I11 i tems require steri le assembly. It is possible that Class I11 items 
may require steri le raw materials. Each part of the steri le assembly wil l  be sterilized 
prior to  assembly by the most appropriate method (heat, gas,  irradiation) and placed into 
the steri le component container shown in Figure 3.3.3-1. This steri le component con- 
tainer can be rapidly assayed to  determine the integrity of the steri le interior by per- 
forming pressure check determinations. Assembly of higher components, utilizing i tems 
of this class,  will be done in ethylene oxide chambers. 
become Class I11 also. These items w i l l  be added to  the Lander after thermal sterilization 
and before the biological protective container or bar r ie r  is sealed. 
The resulting assembly wil l  
3 .3 .4  FUNCTIONAL FLOW CONCEPT 
Figure 3.3.4-1,  the flow diagram of the sterilization sequence (factory-to-launch), shows 
the major operational steps of the sterilization plan. Further breakdown of this flow is 
contained in the manufacturing, handling, and AGE functional flow diagrams. 
The use of an independent biological protective container or bar r ie r  for the assembled 
vehicle poses problems. The most desirable bar r ie r ,  from a weight point of view, would 
be very thin (1 to  5 mils thick). However, the difficulty in maintaining the integrity of this  
fragile envelope, after terminal sterilization may make such an approach impractical. 
The bioiogicai barrier prcb!em is discussed in a later portion of this Volume. 
Truly identical components of the Class 111 type must be replaced following the final 
thermal treatment. 
which will be done upon a terminally sterilized ready-to-fly vehicle. 
Factory testing obviously does not represent the final flight checkout 
3.3 .5  TRANSPORTATION 
Transportation functions begin within the clean room. All of the packing containers that 
a r e  used a r e  sterilized to  avoid additional contamination. In this phase, the vehicle is 
ultraclean rather than sterile. It contains components, however, that a r e  internally 
steri le.  Loaded containers (components, subsystems, etc. ) a r e  flushed with ethylene 
oxide and filled with an inert gas at  a positive pressure (0.26 psi). Such pressurized 
containers can be shipped, or stored, as required. Loss of pressurization would signify 
compromise of the steri le condition. 
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3.4 LAUNCH AREA OPERATIONS 
3.4.1 CONCEPT 
The requirement for assembly of the Lander to the Orbiter a t  the field site, before ter-  
minal sterilization, requires that clean rooms be established at the Atlantic Missile 
Range (AMR) facility. The entire train of events, including all testing, leading to the 
sterilization chamber is conducted within a clean room. 
The terminal sterilization will be thermal. 2ased upon the assumption that the final 
vehicle wil l  include only a minimum of Class I1 items, the Lander wil l  be sealed within 
i t s  biological container and given the specified thermal soak. Liquids, such as coolants 
and battery fluids, will be separately sterilized. This step is required in order that the 
liquids not be within their flight containers during the sterilization process because of the 
weight penalty that would otherwise be paid to strengthen the container walls enough to  
withstand expansion occurring during the 135OC soak. Final design trade-offs have not 
been completed, but it is presently estimated that the vehicle plumbing system required 
for the insertion of liquids wil l  not outweigh the additional materials that would be required 
to resist the expansion pressures  i f  liquids were thermally sterilized in their functional- 
use containers. 
3.4.2 CLASS 111 ASSEM SLY 
The flow diagram, Figure 3.3.4-1, illustrates a complete system including Class I11 
materials. Such materials must be considered until such time as system concepts permit 
their replacement. 
A basic problem area  related to  Class I11 materials, the use of air locks and the transfer 
of ethylene oxide sterilized par ts  into a thermally-sterilized unit, is not improved by 
remote apparatus. A cheaper and more attractive solution appears to be the use of flexible 
plastic tunnels in which a technician could advance and work using rubber gloves similar 
to those used in glove boxes. 
times. 
The exterior surface of the tunnel wil l  be steri le at all 
The flexible plastic tunnel would be sterilized when the thermal sterilization takes place. 
Figure 3.4.2-1 illustrates this concept. The location of the Voyager spacecraft scientific 
experiments dictates that relatively complex assembly operations must take place i f  the 
experimental equipment is of a Class 11 or Class I11 nature. 
Sterility violation would be monitored by adding helium to the tunnel air and monitoring 
the steri le inside of the chamber for leaks. 
After completion of the assembly process, the biological protective barr ier  would be 
sealedj enclosing the steri le Lander. All  operations, including electrical checkout, would 
be done without violation of the barrier.  Transport of the barrier protected Lander would 
be done using a dust-proof container capable of beingflushed with ethylene oxide and inert 
gases. 
3.4.3 BIOLOGICAL BARRIER AND INTERFACE 
Due to the handling difficulties with a fragile envelope and therefore a potential loss of 
biological integrity, a wholly sealed Lander with a rigid bar r ie r  of polyimide is considered 
to be the most practical solution. Prior to the thermal sterilization, the Lander-Orbiter 
interface section wil l  be attached to the base of the Lander. 
is conceived to resemble a form-fitting gasket. The interior (Lander site) would always 
remain sterile. The outer-surface of the interface, which would become contaminated 
immediately upon leaving the sterilization chamber, is attached to the Orbiter by means 
of bolts built into the interface. Exploding nuts will separate the interface from the 
The interface, Figure 3.4.3-1, 
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Figure 3.4.3-1. Lander/Orbiter Interface 
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Lander at the proper time. This operation is described in detail in another section of 
this study report. The interface will remain with the Orbiter after separation. 
The nose of the Lander is sealed with a thermally resistant section of thin plastic (similar 
to  DuPont Polyimide) before thermal treatment. 
* 
3.4.4 FINAL ELECTRICAL CHECKOUT 
Required testing of the Lander can be done directly upon the flight hardware, although it 
is obvious that the Lander, once sealed, cannot be opened. Electrical testing is not 
considered t o  be a problem involving sterilization, inasmuch as sterile connectors would 
be built through the Lander-Orbiter interface. 
3.4.5 RTG FUELING 
Upon completion of ground testing and checkout, the Lander-Orbiter is lifted onto the 
launch gantry. The RTG fueling device is fitted to the nose cone and electrically heated at 
the interlock and nose cone interface for a length of time sufficient to  insure stabilization 
of the mass at a sterilization temperature. Flushing with hot ethylene oxide is also 
practical at this point since the nose shield and the device interlock are ethylene oxide 
tolerant as well as heat resistant. Insertion of the RTG fuel is done through this sterile 
interface. The RTG fuel is steri le by i ts  nature even to  the extent that heat dissipation 
is a problem. A nose cone plug is a part  of the RTG fuel insertion device. It is fitted when 
the fuel is added and the barrier is then resealed. The insertion device is removed from 
the Lander bar r ie r  and the launch shroud emplaced. The interior of the shroud is then 
filled with a positive pressure of ethylene oxide. 
3.4.6 POST LAUNCH 
A pressure outlet built into the shroud wi l l  lower the ethylene oxide pressure as the 
vehicle rises after launch. It has been suggested@) that a helium purge be used after 
ethylene oxide treatment, and that the vehicle be launched carrying positive pressure 
helium. This would save considerable weight and is recommended as a solution. 
The removal of the shroud will release the last of the entrapped gas. It is a remote 
possibility that some spores  or  organisms might drop onto the Lander surface at this 
time. The question of contamination from a shroud leak has been discussed at some 
length by the members of the NASA Ad Hoc Sterilization Committee. The conclusions of 
that Committee and the General Electric engineering staff are in agreement that a shroud 
can be designed that wi l l  accomplish the purpose to the reliability required. 
3.4.7 HANDLING PROCEDURES 
The following step-by-step procedure is recommended t o  attain the goal of delivering a 
s ter i le  Lander to the Martian atmosphere. The steps described here; involved in 
zicsembly, tes t ,  and servicing of the La~der ;  permit utilization of rzasmabk checkout 
procedures while maintaining the vehicle in a sterile condition. 
A. The Lander is assembled in a clean room as shown in Figure 
3.4.7-1. Procedures and facilities employed are designed to  maintain a 
high degree of cleanliness throughout the assembly operation. 
Figure 3.4.7-1. Assembly of Lander in Clean Room 
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B. Lander acceptance tes ts  (performance testing, alignment, dynamic balance 
and c. g. determination, and vibration testing) are performed in a clean 
room environment. When it is necessary to  transport the vehicle outside a 
clean area, a sealed plastic shroud is employed. These operations a r e  
shown in Figure 3.4.7-2. 
C. 
I 
oj 
Figure 3.4.7-2. Lander Acceptance Tests  
Systems tests of the Voyager Spacecraft are conducted with each Lander 
enclosed in a plastic shroud as shown in Figure 3.4.7-3. 
be opened if necessary, provided that adequate precautions are taken to pre- 
serve the cleanliness of the Landers. 
The shrouds may 
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Do Thermal-vacuum testing of the Voyager Spacecraft is carr ied out with the 
plastic shrouds removed from the Landers since the thermal vacuum chamber 
will meet clean room environmental requirements. The technique is shown 
in Figure 3.4.7-4. 
Figure 3.4.7-4. Thermal-Vacuum Test  
E. Final in-house Voyager Spacecraft systems tes ts  a r e  performed with the 
Landers again enclosed in their plastic shrouds as sketched in Figure 
3.4.7-5. 
Figure 3.4.7-5. Final In-House Systems Tests 
F. The Landers a re  removed from the Orbiter and final in-house Lander check- 
out tes ts  and alignment checks ai=e condticted iii a clean room. Each Lander 
is then again placed in a sealed plastic shroud and prepared for shipment 
to  AMR, which follows. Preparation for shipment is shown in Figure 
3.4.7 -6. 
Figure 3.4.7-6. Preparation for Shipment 
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G. Upon arr ival  at AMR, each Lander is transferred to  a sterilization chamber 
that is a clean room environment. The plastic shroud is removed and 
discarded as sketched in Figure 3.4.7-7. 
Figure 3.4.7-7. Lander Ready for AMR Sterilization Chamber 
H. The Lander is placed in fixtures provided and partially disassembled as 
shown in the sketch, Figure 3.4.7-8. Any vehicle components which a r e  
not heat tolerant a r e  removed from the Lander and placed in the gas sterili- 
zation bay. The sterilization chamber is closed, sealed, and pressurized, 
and the temperature is raised and stabilized a t  135OC for 24 hours. In the 
gas sterilization bay, the surfaces of the components there a r e  sterilized by 
exposure to  ethylene oxide. 
Besides the vehicle itself, the sterilization chamber also contains all tools 
and fixtures required for reassembly of the Lander, a complete set  of spare 
par ts ,  a shielded radioisotope fuel cartridge loading mechanism, and the 
container that wi l l  later encapsulate the Lander to maintain it in a steri le 
condition. 
Figure 3.4.7-8. AMR Sterilizzttion Chxm-her 
I. Following the heat and ethylene oxide sterilization cycles, the Lander is 
reassembled as shown in Figure 3.4.7-9. Sterility is maintained through 
use of "tunnel" type suits, as described earlier in Figure 3.4.2-1. 
J. Upon completion of reassembly, the Lander remains in the sterilization 
chamber and undergoes final systems checkout and alignment. Again "tunnel" 
type suits a r e  employed along with specially devised instrumentation. The 
last operation performed is installation of squibs and igniters. The opera- 
tion is shown in Figure 3.4.7-10. 
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Figure 3.4.7-11. Encapsulation in Two-Piece Container 
L. The Lander in its container is  transported to  the assembly a rea  as shown in 
Figure 3.4.7-12. 
Figure 3.4.7-12. Transportation of Lander 
M. The Landers, in containers, a r e  installed aboard the Orbiter. The Lander 
Orbiter interface checks a r e  performed as shown in Figure 3.4.7-13. 
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Figure 3.4.7-13. Installation of Landers Aboard Orbiter and Lander Orbiter 
N. The Voyager Spacecraft is installed aboard the booster as shown in Figure 
3.4.7-14. 
Figure 3.4.7-14. Installation of Voyager Spacecraft Aboard Booster 
0. The radioisotope fuel cartridge loading mechanism is mated to  the Lander 
container as shown in Figure 3.4.7-15. (The loading mechanism was sterilized 
in the sterilization chamber along with the Lander. ) The '%ck" on the 
loading mechanism is then sterilized. 
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Figure 3.4.7-15. Mating of RTG Fuel Loading Mechanism 
P. Within the sterilization lock, the protective covers a r e  removed from the 
loading mechanism and from the Lander container. The radioisotope fuel 
cartridge along with the RTG cover plate and a plug of ablative heat shield 
material is installed in the Lander. The protective cover is replaced on the 
Lander container, still within the sterilization lock as sketched in Figure 
3.4.7-16. (For an explanation of the operation of the radioisotope fuel car-  
tridge loading mechanism, see Section 3.4.8. ) 
' I  
47 T I  
Figure 3.4.7-16. Installation of RTG Fuel Cartridge 
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Q. The radioisotope fuel cartridge loading mechanism and associated equipment 
a r e  removed from the Spacecraft as sketched in Figure 3.4.7-17. 
Figure 3.4.7-17. RTG Fuel Load Mechanism Removed 
R. The flight shroud is installed as shown in Figure 3.4.7-18. If desired, the 
volume within the shroud can be purged with ethylene oxide followed by 
helium. 
Figure 3.4.7-18. Installation of Flight Shroud 
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S. The Landers remain in  their sealed and pressurized containers during launch 
and while the flight shroud is separated from the Voyager Spacecraft (pre- 
sumably during second stage burn). The step is shown in Figure 3.4.7-19. 
Figure 3.4.7-19. Flight Shroud Separation 
T. Immediately subsequent to flight shroud separation, the upper portions of the 
Lander containers are separated as shown in Figure 3.4.7-20. The lower 
section of each container remains with the Orbiter when the Landers are 
separated for their entry into the Martian Atmosphere. 
/ 
r 
Figure 3.4.7-20. Lander Separation 
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' The advantages of the preceding procedure a re :  
1. The Lander is assembled arid tested in a clean environment to assure  a low 
original organism count. 
2. The Lander is sterilized in the sterilization chamber by use of heat or by 
use of ethylene oxide when components with low heat tolerance a r e  involved. 
The chamber is sealed and pressurized to produce controlled leakage in the 
direction desired (out of the chamber). 
3. Lander performance and reliability is assured because each vehicle is 
checked out after sterilization. 
a r e  on hand in the chamber. 
Should any malfunction occur, spare par ts  
4. Procedures are relatively safe since squibs and igniters a r e  installed 
following checkout of the circuits involved. 
5. The rigid pressurized container lends itself to efficient handling and ser- 
vicing operations prior t o  launch. It has  relatively little likelihood of 
sustaining damage. It wi l l  permit storage of the vehicle for an extended 
period should this be necessary. 
6. Use of a pressurized container permits leakage to flow only in the direction 
away from the sterilized Lander, thereby, assuring maintenance of sterili- 
zation. 
Problems associated with this procedure are: 
1. The protective container is "opened" to install the radioisotope fuel car-  
tridge. 
3.4.8.  ) 
(This is performed under closely controlled conditions; see Section 
2. A rigid container wi l l  add considerable weight to the flight package. (The 
greater part of this weight is separated during boost, however, so that it 
has  relatively little effect on mission performance. ) 
Other methods of maintaining sterility have been investigated. Most of them involve a 
thin plastic bag to act as the biological barrier.  The idea of using such a bag has been 
rejected because of the following problems: 
1. Difficulty would be encountered in sealing the plastic bag (and resealing it 
following radioisotope cartridge insertion). 
unless a good seal  is obtained. 
Sterility cannot be assured 
2. The chance of damage t o  a plastic bag during handling, servicing, and tes t  
operations, subsequent to sterilization, is very high. This could result in 
contamination of the Lander. 
3. The biological barrier itself, with all its mechanical and electrical inter- 
faces with the Lander, presents problems. The Orbiter and support equip- 
ment would become a rather complex piece of equipment of appreciable 
weight. 
ment of a compact and reliable article. 
Furthermore, the plastic bag does not lend itself well to the develop- 
4. Separation is difficult t o  accomplish with a plastic bag. The possibility of 
entanglement with the Lander or the Orbiter exits. The result could be 
contamination of the Lander a t  this time. 
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3.4.8 
Figure 3.4.8-1 furnishes a mechanical schematic of a device for loading the RTG fuel 
capsule into the Lander. The schematic does not furnish a 11 of the design details but does 
illustrate the salient features of the loading and sterilizing mechanism. 
OPERATION OF THE RADIOISOTOPE FUEL LOADER 
RTG 
RADIATOR 
FUEL CAPSULE 
I1  I J 7 - DRIVE MECHANISM 
PROTECTIVE 
COVER t 
ACTUATOR 
LOADING MECHANISM @ 
PRIMARY SEA 
ENGAGED 
SECONDARY SEAL 
ENGAGED 
/ 
NOSE PLUG (HEATSHIELD) 
RTG CHAMBER 
COVER 
STERILIZATION 
LOCK 
PROTECTIVE 
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SECONDARY 
SEAL 
PRIMARY 
SEAL 
 
Figure 3.4.8-1. Mechanical Schematic, RTG Loading Device 
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A typical operation of the unit will be as follows: 
A. With the Lander installed aboard the Orbiter and the entire spacecraft atop 
the booster, the loading mechanism is brought into position, sealed, and 
locked to  the Lander, as shown in Figure 3.4.8-2. 
B. 
C. 
Figure 3.4.8-2. Mating of Loading Mechanism to Lander 
The sterilization lock is sterilized by heat or by ethylene oxide or by a 
combination of these, thereby, providing an environment far more rigorous 
than that to which the Lander itself w a s  originally exposed in the sterilization 
facility. The operation is shown in Figure 3.4.8-3. 
Figure 3.4.8-3. Operation of Sterilization Lock 
Upon completion of the sterilization of the lock, secondary seals a r e  en- 
gaged. These seals a r e  designed to produce controlled leakage of ethylene 
oxide so  that no organism could possibly enter the sterilized lock. The step 
is shown in Figure 3.4.8-4. 
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A 
Figure 3.4.8-4. Engagement of Secondary Seals 
D. The protective covers at either end of the lock are removed, remotely, and 
the RTG fuel capsule is inserted and locked along with its cover plate and 
the necessary block of ablative shield material that forms the outer covering 
of the vehicle. The operation is shown in Figure 3.4.8-5. 
Figure 3.4.8-5. Insertion of RTG Fuel Capsule 
E. The protective cover is replaced over the vehicle and the seals between the 
sterilization lock and the Lander a r e  broken. The loading mechanisn is 
removed. Prevention of contamination in the joint on the ablation shield can 
be accomplished by means of a controlled leakage seal utilizing ethylene 
oxide. The operation is shown in Figure 3.4.8-6. 
Ill 
Figure 3.4.8-6. Removal of Loading Mechanism 
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' 3.5 BIOLOGICAL BARRIER 
3.5.1 CONCEPT 
Design requirements for the biological barrier for the Lander vehicle have been carefully 
examined. A brief concept of the protective container (or bar r ie r )  is as follows: 
The steri le protective container (or barrier)  surrounds the Lander portion of the Voyager 
system from the time of thermal sterilization until approximately 500,000 f t  into space. 
In addition, the Lander is sealed, thus providing the primary shield against contamination. 
This inner barr ier  is never entered, once it is sealed and pressurized, thereby, guaran- 
teeing the integrity of the sterilization performed. 
3.5.2 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Preliminary design requirements of the container were as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
It will have electrical connections for check-out and test. This will  involve 
an estimated 5 connections. 
It will have "hose" fittings for liquids and gases. It is estimated that two 
fittings for liquid and one fitting for gas will be required. 
It will  be sealable by "hot iron" heat or  some other simple equivalent method. 
It will  be big enough to  contain Lander, RTG and protective container, and 
r e  mote handling gear. 
It will  have straps,  handles, o r  fasteners for attachment to  the shroud. 
It will  leave an opening large enough to  accept i tems without tearing. 
It will  be as lightweight as possible since the bar r ie r  accompanies the space- 
craft into space. 
It will not be affected by hot (up to  100°C) or cold ethylene oxide. 
It will not be affected by heat up to 300°F (15OOC). 
It will have a method for cutting off a section when the shroud is ejected during 
flight. 
It will require a built-in electrical junction box between Lander and Orbiter. 
A rigid or form-fitting end for  the Orbiter fit is reqdired. Rigidity Qn 
remainder of bag is not desired (except when loading). 
The purpose of barr ier  is to keep out bacteria spores and other microorgan- 
isms. 
The preliminary size estimate is that it will  be a tube 10 ft long and 10 ft in 
diameter. This length must be indefinite until remote isotope handling gear 
is designed. 
To avoid carrying the junction box into space, it will be possible to  detach 
this before flight. 
A support frame will be designed to  hold the container open when inserting 
the Lander, etc. 
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3.5.3 DISCUSSION 
Such a containerjbarrier is technologically feasible. Du Pont Polyimide plastics meet 
many of these above specifications. Yet, even without this barrier, the Lander can still be 
sealed tightly. The shroud can still be easily designed to hold a final gaseous purge. The 
nose cone material is still capable of withstanding ethylene oxide. Therefore, by means 
such as these, a sterile capsule interior can still be maintained. 
The problems of handling the capsule within a separate plastic primary barrier are dis- 
cussed at length within the GSE portion of the study report. 
The interface between the Lander and Orbiter will not change as a result  of incorporating 
the plastic bar r ie r  in the design. (The operational sequence for sterile separation in the 
vicinity of the target is described elsewhere in the report. ) The interface material can be 
of any thermally-resistant material and, though assembled to  the Lander first, it is 
essentially a par t  of the Orbiter af ter  separation. The interface material is internally 
sterile, since it is treated with ethylene oxide before flight. Only the exterior side toward 
the Orbiter may be assumed to be contaminated. 
Figure 3.5.3-1 illustrates the assembly and separation of the L a n d e r h b i t e r  with their 
interface. 
3.5.4 RECOMMENDATION 
The recommendation, based on the studies discussed in the preceding paragraphs, is t o  
utilize the exterior of the Lander as the primary sterility barrier. The additional plastic 
bar r ie r  would be used as additional protection. 
THERMALLY 
RESISTANT 
BARRIER, . 
STERILITY BARRIER 
‘ORBITER 
L/O RETAINER BOLTS r<sa SHRAPNEL EXPLODED UTS FREE 
Figure 3.5.3-1. Conceptional Drawing of Lander/Orbiter Interface 
3-26 
3.6 
Irradiation by nuclear particles has been studied as a means of terminal sterilization of 
the spacecraft. This technique is not considered feasible for the reasons discussed 
below. The Radiation Effects Information Center at  Battelle Institute has been consulted 
for effects on electronic components. 
RADIATION STERILIZATION OF COMPONENTS AND PARTS 
Exposure energies in e rgs  can be directly related to  specific heats and to weights of 
particular materials. Thus, a temperature-equivalent can be derived. The integrated 
neutron flux (nvt) can be roughly translated into energy as follows: lo8 neutron/cm2 = 
(0.1 MeV) 25 ergs/gm. This relationship is  the carbon relationship, but the resul ts  
obtained should be sufficiently close to give an understanding of the problem. For 
example: an electronic device, that wi l l  withstand 1015 neutrons (steady state), can be 
expected t o  withstand 
6 15 25 7 2.5 x 10 rads 10 nvt x - = 25 x 10 ergs/gram. 
1 o8 
Approximatlg 100 ergs  = one rad. 
Then: 
a 6 2.5 x 10 e rgs  = 2.5 x 10 rads. 
A conservative figure for sterilization purposes would be a requirement of 10" rads to  
insure a lethal dose to microorganisms. In the case in question, then, sterilization by 
means of radiation would be inadequate. Each case must be individually treated. Trade- 
offs, however, involving combinations of techniques are possible. An additional consid- 
eration is that the components wi l l  be subjected to additional radiation during the voyage. 
This must be estimated and added to the total sterilization dosage when calculating 
component reliability for the entire trip. 
Possible trade-offs include such considerations as the radiation resistance of germanium 
devices as compared to silicon devices, the effect of shielding on voyage dose, etc. In 
view of the difficulties of dry heat or chemical sterilization, each potential problem 
component should be examined to determine radiation tolerance level. It would seem 
possible that relatively large sections may be efficiently sterilized by radiation. 
The effects of combined radiation and temperature are generally unknown. Active inves- 
tigation is proceeding within this area. As  this information becomes available it should 
be examined for applicability. 
It is most probable that the use of irradiation on the Voyager program should be limited 
to steriiization of items that camot t&e thermal or  ethylene oxide treatment. The 
attached table, Table 3.6-1, indicates the state-of-the-art and potential development. 
TABLE 3.6-1. 
Section A: Exposure, e rgs  gm-' (C) 
STATUS OF MATERIALS IN RELATION TO 
NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT 
(1) Materia 1 
Elastomers 
Plastics 
Fuels 
Lubricants and Hydraulic Fluids 
5 lo9  
7 lo9 
lo9 
5 x 1o1O 
(2 1 Material 
5 x 1 0  10 
2 x 10l2 
5 x 10l2 
11 5 x 10 
3-27 
TABLE 3.6-1. (Cont'd) 
2 Section B: Integrated Flux, N/cm 
Material (1) Material (2) 
Structural Metals 1O2O 1O2O 
Ceramics lo1 1O2O 
E lec tronic Components 10l8  
Semi-Conductors 
(1) Current materials are satisfactory to this dosage. 
(2) Materials under development may give satisfactory service to this dosage. 
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* 3.7 STERILIZATION WITH ETHYLENE OXIDE 
Thermal sterilization treatments a r e  to be used wherever possible to provide internal as 
well as surface sterilization for Voyager systems. Where the nature of the component 
module, part, etc. ,  is such as to preclude thermal treatment, chemical sterilization, 
utilizing a 12 percent ethylene oxide, 88 percent Freon 12 gaseous mixture, provides a 
good backup technique. In addition, terminal sterilization can be preserved by main- 
taining a slight positive pressure of this gas mixture in an air-tight shroud. 
3.7.1 MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY 
Information on the effects of ethylene oxide and ethylene oxide-freon mixtures on the 
properties of materials is limited. While there a r e  some indications that these effects 
are, in most instances, not cri t ical  (References 7 and 8): it ispevertheless,  necessary 
to  test  candidate materials for compatibility. A small  tes t  chamber wil l  permit evaluation 
of materials subjected, not only t o  chemical sterilization conditions, but a lso to thermal 
conditions. Synergistic effects can also be studied with the aid of this chamber. The 
development of analytical methods for accurate and rapid determination of degradation 
products, structural  modifications, phase transitions, etc. 
of data on the materials'  behavior and reaction mechanisms. 
is essential for accumulation 
3.7.2 STERILIZATION EFFICIENCY 
The effectiveness of ethylene oxide and ethylene oxide-inert gas mixtures as sterilants 
is not yet fully established. Those parameters most in need of investigation are: 
1. Humidity 
2. Temperature 
3. Pressure  
It has been shown that there is a relationship between relative humidity and sterilizing 
action. Optimization of this relationship f while concurrently protecting components, 
par ts ,  etc. from moisture attack) is necessary. 
The increase in temperature of sterilization of a mere lOOC has been shown to increase 
the sterilizing efficiency of ethylene oxide (i. e. , reduce the required exposure time for 
100 percent kill) by a factor of 2.74 (9). The range of temperatures studied (5-37OC) was 
limited; however, further investigation is required. 
Little or nothing is known of the effect of higher than atmospheric ethylene oxide environ- 
ment pressures.  This should be studied along with the effects of combined humidity/ 
te mperatur e/pr es sure  variations . 
In addition to  the above, further studies to obtain data on time/concentration effects 
should be initiated. 
3.7.3 PERSONNEL HAZARDS 
Ethylene oxide is dangerous both as a toxic material  and as a highly combustible gas. 
Ethylene oxide has a maximum allowable concentration of 50 ppm in air and a minimum 
explosive limit in air of 13 percent. The 12  percent ethylene oxide - 88 percent Freon 12 
mixture is not an explosive hazard in air; however, the health hazard remains. In view 
of this,  handling procedures must be prescribed and safety equipment design and testing 
initiated. 
In addition, since the rate of sterilization is apparently proportional to the concentration 
of ethylene oxide, the possibility of using higher concentrations of ethylene oxide should 
be investigated. It is recognized that this would increase the hazards associated with 
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ethylene oxide; nevertheless, it has been shown that ethylene oxide can be handled safely 
and efficiently using simplified procedures and observing safe handling regulations. Com- 
bining higher ethylene oxide concentration with slightly elevated temperatures (35-50°C) 
may provide a more efficient sterilization procedure. 
Figure 3.7.3-1 illustrates that primary dependence upon ethylene oxide is not justifiable. 
There are reports that use of ethylen ide alone may never reduce microorganism pop- 
ulation to  zero for a given organism ?l8r The curve also illustrates the usefulness of 
ethylene oxide for reducing bacteriological load. The efficiency of this process is heavily 
dependent upon initial population. It is obvious that a reduction in initial load will vary 
the acceptable portion of the curve. Thus, ethylene oxide treatment is a useful technique 
at various points in the assembly and handling process. 
3.7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that a study of ethylene oxide sterilization to  provide data upon which 
to  base f i rm decisions be initiated. 
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3.8 THERMAL STERILIZATION 
3.8.1 DISCUSSION 
Koesterer has conducted extensive studies on heat as a sterilizing medium. Dry heat 
has been selected as the primary method (over moist heat) to lessen the possibility of 
damage to the components of the spacecraft. It is not possible to accurately predict the 
resistance of a spore population to a lethal agent. With heat, the order of death of an 
organism population has been assumed to be logarithmic. This implies death is a function 
of the time-temperature relationship involved, assuming a lethal temperature is used. If 
the theory of logarithmic death functions were perfectly true, then by using techniques and 
theories long employed by the food industry, thermal-death rates and times could be easily 
predicted. Consistent data at temperatures of interest has not beenoavailable, but there 
is general agreement that the final terminal cycle of 24 hours at 135 C wil l  eliminate 
even the long lived exceptions to the heat-death theory, particularly in a population already 
exposed to the prior sterilization treatment described previously. Biological load reduc- 
tion, then is considered to play an important part  in constructing a s ter i le  vehicle. It 
may be said that to some unknown extent, sterility treatments are additive. 
It is important to differentiate here between the survivor curves of ethylene oxide and 
dry heat. It has been stated in the previous section that it is possible that no amount of 
ethylene oxide treatment can guarantee a sterile end-product. A curve of thermal treat-  
nent w i l l  tend to resemble the ethylene oxide curve with this exception. There is a temp- 
erature-time point where lethality is assured when using heat. The lowest possible com- 
pletely lethal temperature for each organism is not known; however, 135OC has been 
assumed to be above this lethal point when combined with Jong exposure. It is possible 
that future research may uncover organisms that survive'this treatment. The alternatives at 
this time would be to raise the temperature, lengthen the'exposure, o r  to start with 
such a low initial population that acceptable probability of sterility for any given vehicle 
is reached. The third alternative, described above, must be introduced into the recom- 
mended sterilization process, achieved by clean rooms and repetitive sanitization and 
sterilization treatment, from manufacturing on through launch. 
Figure 3.8.1-1 illustrates a typical thermal population versus t ime curve, and Figure 
3.8.1-2 is a time versus temperature curve. Only the straight line portions of this type 
data curve should be used. 
3.8.2 VEHICLE DESIGN 
The need for steri le planetary entry vehicles imposes two strenuous conditions upon the 
vehicle design as follows: 
1. The vehicle must survive an extended soak at elevated temperatures. 
2. The vehicle must be fabricated in such a manner that it can be successfully 
decontaminated and then sterilized by dry heat. 
The exposure to sterilization temperatures occurs prior to other design conditions. Thus 
the vehicle must pass through the sterilization cycle and s t i l l  maintain all its functional 
capability and s t i l l  possess adequate strength to perform its mission. 
These requirements impose the problems of designing a structure for  elevated tempera- 
tu re  and for accommodating o r  minimizing the effects of thermal transients and gradients. 
The total  time at temperature can be quite extensive due to thermal lag within the space- 
craft. This may impose limitations on material selection to avoid effects such as overaging 
of some of the aluminum and magnesium alloys. The structure must not contain entrapped 
microorganisms 
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EXPOSURE TIME 
Type Thermal 
Each curve represents  a different temperature.  All tempera- 
t u re s  in lethal range of organism. 
Figure 3.8.1-1. Survivor Curves for Microorganisms 
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* Problem areas  in design and fabrication imposed by these requirements and establishment 
of guidelines for preferred materials, design concepts and configurations, fastening and 
joining methods, manufacturing, assembly, an sterilization procedures for this type of 
vehicle a r e  the objectives of a current study(ll 4 . 
The ideal structure for elevated temperature would be statically determinate and f ree  
from reisidual stresses. It would be constructed of a material  which had no noticeable 
loss of properties after the thermal cycle. Under these conditions, the temperature and 
thermal gradients would not play an important role. The thermal gradients would be 
important only in s3 far as they were not linear in nature. 
For decontamination, the ideal would be a homogeneous, integral structure. The structure 
should be physically smooth to facilitate cleaning. For sterilization, the structure must 
be constructed s o  that all its components can be brought rapidly to sterilization tempera- 
ture. 
The above requirements are nA necessarily mutually incompatible; however, they a r e  
not completely attainable because of other requirements on the structure. How far a de- 
sign must vary from the ideal, as discussed above,. wi l l  be a measure of the problems 
in'roduced by the sterilization requirement. 
Three significant aspects of the sterilization process with regard to structure a r e  readily 
apparent: 
1. Rate of heating to and from soak temperature (thermal gradients) 
2. Soak temperature 
3. Time at  m a k  temperature. 
These must be investigated thoroughly for their effects on the structure and structural  
materials. 
Based on investigations already performed b] GE-MSD, several  prime sources of struc- 
tural  difficulty can bz pinpointed. Dimensional stability may be compromised by the thermal 
soak cycle. This is of particular importance for non-metallic or  low yield strength materials, 
opl;ical, and control instrumentation. Severe thermal gradients with accompanying s t resses  
and possible excessive distortions occur wherever camponents of vastly different thick- 
nesses are adjoining. Local concentrations of material  should therefore be avoided. A 
like condition a r i ses  where thermally dissimilar materials are used next to each other. 
Thg iollowing structural  areas are critical a reas  in respect to elevated temperature and 
are indicative of the problems which ar ise  through sterilization rigors: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Sandwich panels and laminated structures,  particularly where dissimihr 
materials are employed o r  where thermal gradients cannat be readily avoided. 
Attachments into honeycomb an81 similar sandwich materials where applica- 
tion of heat may degrade the connections such that flight loads cannot be 
sustained. 
Thin shells with massive stiffeners wi l l  be avoided because of the unequal 
heating ra tes  of the two different masses  which caase thermal s t resses  and 
distortions. 
Various types of component support structure found both internally and ex- 
ternally to the vehicle such as composite beams, brackets, shear panels, 
etc. These are particularly susceptible where they mount components re- 
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quiring alignment accuracy such as optics, control n x z l e s ,  momentum 
wheels, antennas and similar instruments common to spacecraft. Permanent 
distortion due to the thermal el'fects of sterilization may be intolerable, and 
s p x i a l  mounLing concepts may be required. 
5. Sealed and pressurized structures, tanks, and highpressure vessels where 
the sterilization thermal cycle can damage seals by distortion or material  
degradation, and internal pressures may be increased during the steriliza- 
tion process to excessive levels. Also, the pnysical support of these units 
can be significantly affected by heating and w i l l  warrant investigation. 
6. Structural devices where preload must be maintained or devices which de- 
pend on specific spring rates  that can be degraded by the temperature levels 
required for sterilization. An example of this is spring-deployed solar 
paddles or booms. 
7. Structural components susceptible to degradation o r  damage due to strains 
f rom differential coefficients of thermal expansion such as lugs employing 
steel  bushings pressed into aluminum or  magnesium or various joints where 
close tolerances must be maintained, such that yielding due to temperature 
w i l l  degrade later performance a t  flight loads and vibration levels. 
The a reas  listed must be investigated with the intent of fully defining the structural  prob- 
lems associated with the present concept of sterilization. 
3 .8 .3  THERMAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The use of heat for spacecraft sterilization makes it desirable that goad heat flow paths 
exist between the external surfaces of the vehicle and the innermost patential bacteria 
site. When such heat flow paths consist of homogeneous solids, the thermal properties 
of the material  itself a r e  important for the establishment of minimum transient time dur- 
ing the heating cycle. Selection of materials and dimensions, such that d3sired thermal 
properties a r e  obtained, wi l l  result  in a dimensionless parameter of the proper magnitude 
to minimize the heating transient. These considerations apply equally to the cool-down 
procedure after sterilization. 
The present generation of spacecraft which need to be sterilized a r e  not hDmogeneous 
bodies, but consist of bolted, clamped, welded and otherwise joined assemblies. For 
this reason the thermal conductance through such composite structures must first be 
known and then be improved in order to minimize total heating time. The General Electric 
Company has investigated the problem of joint thermal conductance on a continuing basis 
for several  years as shown in the published papers in References 1 2  and 13. This investi- 
gation is continuing. 
The information obtained during this period is directly applicabie to the evaluation of 
heating rates for spacecraft joints under consideration. To illustrate the variation of 
thermal  joint conductance with contact pressure in a vacuum environment, several  curves 
from References 12 and 13 a r e  shown in Figures 3.8 .3-1  to 3.8,3-3.  Figure 3 .8 ,3 -4  
shows the effects of nm-metallic heat transfer promoting fi l lers.  
When a spacecraft is designed, adequate heat flow paths a r e  normally provided between 
heat generating and heat dissipating surfaces. These heat flow paths wi l l  be useful in the 
spacecraft heating cycle during sterilization. However, there a r e  numerous appreciable 
"thermal masses" within a typical spacecraft, which are not heat dissipators and, there- 
fore, a r e  not provided with adequate heat flow paths to the vehicle skin. For this reason, 
one of the major efforts of the final design will have to  include the identification and 
improvement of the heat flow paths for such non-heat generating mass  concentrations. 
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> Examples of such improvements include: reduction of heat flow path length, substitution 
of materials, elimination or  reduction of contact resistances, re-distribution of masses,  
and improved fastening methods. 
An atmosphere of nitrogen o r  helium or other inert gas  is maintained during the heating 
cycle. This results in an appreciable reduction of the transient through heat transfer by 
gaseous conduction and convection as w e l l  as by solid conduction and radiation. The pre- 
sence of an inert gas during heating, with gas removal after the 145 C soak temperature 
has been reached, appears to be an attractive solution; since, for example, the heat t rans-  
fer across  a spacecraft aluminum joint at  5 psi contact pressure is 20 times better in 
air o r  nitrogen at  atmospheric pressure than in a vacuum as established by experimental 
data (Figure 3.8 .3-1) .  Also, experiments performed using multi-layer reflective thermal 
insulation, a common spacecraft material, have shown that the transient temperature 
regime can be reduced drastically by maintaining several  hundred microns pressure 
during the heating cycle. The use of forced convection heating also must be considered, 
since the transport of heat to remote components by conduction and radiation may im- 
pose severe temperature gradients. 
0 
Because of the difficulties inherent in instrumenting flight hardware for temperature 
monitoring with thermocouples, it is very important for the thermal conductivities of 
joints to be predictable. The study of structural joints for sterilization by externally 
applied heat must include the variations of properties as well as the properties themselves. 
3 . 8 . 4  JOINING AND FASTENING METHODS 
When the prospect of requiring joints and fasteners in space vehicle structures to be 
sterilized is considered, the number of problems involved is multiplied over those met 
when only structural  integrity is important. Not only must the connections between struc- 
tural  members be considered but also those connections in tubes and pipes which car ry  
working fluids and those connections of sheet metal pieces which make the vehicle itself 
a container. Three distinct problems arise: maintaining structural  integrity of the joint, 
the sterilization of the joint and maintenance of that condition, and the requirement of 
zero leakage of fluids through joints in fluid carrying members. 
The requirement that structural  joints (as in frames, supports and vehicle skins) be 
sterile, while in use, means that many joining techniques are not adequate. The choice 
of the proper means of connection, i. e., nut and bolt, riveting, welding, brazing, etc., 
must be made, not only with the consideration of strength, but also with the consideration 
of the susceptibility of the joint to contamination. A particular joint must be designed so 
that it can be made steri le a t  the time of the assembly, but it must also be designed so 
that it may be maintained steri le while in  use. 
Where connections a r e  made to join fluid carrying tubes or pipes, potential contamination 
due io iilip1-oper design is mzgnified. The requirement of a leakproof joint is present 
where the vehicle itself must provide adequate means to prevent contamination from an 
outside atmosphere o r  to an outside atmosphere. The vehicle is required to be a leakproof 
container. This results in many associated problems, such as the sealing of orifices 
through which shafts o r  antennas may project from the vehicle. 
The problem of designing both structural joints and leakproof fluid connectors, such that 
they may be thermally sterilized during o r  shortly after assembly, requires even more 
stringent conditions on the hardware. Whatever means of sterilization used must en- 
su re  that the structural  integrity of the joint a d  the leakproof characteristics of the fluid 
connector are maintained. Since the sterilization process includes temperature cycling, 
the use of some temperature sensitive materials for fluid connectors is immediately ruled 
out. Both in the case of structural  joints and fluid connector joints, a reduction must be 
made in the number of surface crevasses and voids in the joint area. A criterion for de- 
sign must be that voids, cracks, and crevasses be reduced or omitted completely since 
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'contamination is closely associated with the number of voids in the materials and since 
sterilization becomes more difficult as the number and s izes  of voids increase. Hence, 
conventional use of nuts, bolts, and rivets creates problems, whereas welding, brazing, 
and bonding techniques appear to be more suitable. 
* 
3.8.5 APPLICATION -- OF HEAT 
Although thermal sterilization has been recommended by the NASA Ad Hoc Committee, 
and is endorsed by the study, the means of applying heat to the vehicle has not been dis- 
cussed except to state that d r y  heat is a n  acceptable approach. 
It is proposed that thermal sterilization be accomplished by use of a n  inert gas such as 
nitrogen or  helium, which is heated gradually while circulating in and about the vehicle. 
Such an  inert gas has the advantage of not reacting with any vehicle component o r  consti- 
tuent. The use of a recirculating system, such as is shown in  Figure 3.8.5-1, is recom- 
mended, since it can accomplish the tasks of circulation, heating and filtration quite 
efficiently. This conceptual heating method can be applied to the sterilization chamber. 
- 
The proposed system has the following features ancl advantages: 
1. This method provides "self" temperature control, since gas temperature is 
limiting. Thus, regardless of the duration of the procedure, no part can 
exceed gas temperature. 
2. The use of suitable baffles, splitters ancl guide vanes in conjunction with 
planned openings in the vehicle o r  Lander resul ts  in a sterilization system 
where the heated gas distribution offers a minimum heating period. In order 
to assure  adequate gas distribution, model flow-visualization tes ts  wi l l  be 
required. 
3. As stated before, a number of openings must be left in the vehicle o r  Lander 
to permit entry and exit for the heated gas during the process. 
4. Adequate heating of even the most remote part  is assured by thermocouples 
placed and monitored in selected locations. To select these locations, heat 
transfer analysis on composite structures wi l l  be required. On the basis 
of current work on "Thermal Joint Conductance Studies" in progress at MSD, 
experimental and analytical tools to do this are available. 
The major advantages of the proposed gas sterilization methods are: the reduction of 
temQerature differentials between application point of the heating medium and any interior 
point following maximum thermal resistance, and a means to car ry  out thermal  steriliza- 
tion at the launch site. 
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CLEAN ROOMS * 3.9 
Figure 3.9-1 illustrates a typical laminar flow clean room enclosure. One end is a clean 
air supply and the other is a return module. A re turn air plenum connects the two via a 
double ceiling. Clean air moves through the room at the rate of approximately one mile 
per hour, filling the room from side to side and floor to  ceiling. The air flow removes 
all but the heaviest particulate matter from personnel and par ts  as soon as it becomes 
airborne. Essentially, there are 100 air changes a minute across  any one foot section. 
The usual incidentals of clean rooms such as air showers, shoe cleaners, etc.,  a r e  un- 
necessary since dust from clothing is continually carried out of the room by the laminar flow 
as soon as it becomes airborne and since it has no place to accumulate. A clean room of 
this type may be shut down for extended periods with little loss in efficiency. The dust 
count can be expected to  be less than 1000 particles per  cubic foot. Figure 3.9-2 graphs 
the dust levels of various types of clean room facilities as compared to  the laminar flow 
method. It is proposed that an  enclosed clean room of this type be utilized where par ts  
or modules a r e  assembled prior t o  part sterilization as outlined in the flow diagrams. 
A similarly designed system would be utilized for major assembly and test operations. 
Figures 3. 9-3 and 3.9-4 illustrate an open ended laminar flow clean room operation. 
This is particularly useful inasmuch as free access of personnel and equipment is per- 
mitted. 
As stated before, clean room operation should be done throughout the system at every 
stage of manufacture and assembly, except during metal pouring, molding, and casting 
operations. 
‘ Y  
Figure 3.9-1. Typical Laminar/Cross Flow Clean Room 
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This walk-in ultra clean work station will meet Class 
IV dust level requirements as stated in U. S. A i r  Force 
Tech. Order 00-25-203 and will meet the standard clean 
room dust level requirements as stated in the proposed 
revision to USAF T. 0. 00-25-203. It will meet dust 
count requirements of all three classes of clean rooms 
as stated in the proposed Federal Standard on Clean 
Rooms. The dust count is guaranteed to be less than 
1,000 particles per cubic foot above 0 .3  microns in 
size, which is 10 times cleaner than the average hos- 
pital operation room. 
Figure 3.9-3. Open Ended Clean Room with Removeable Sections 
A truck can be driven in its open end (the air is clean 
for many feet beyond): unload parts, and as fast as 
the truck leaves the room is clean again (the space 
between the modular blower/filter wall and the truck 
stays less than Class 10,000 or better at all times). 
Figure 3.9-4. Open Ended Clean Room Operation 
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3.10 STERILITY CONTROL GROUP 
3.10.1 CONCEPT 
has stated that, "The effect of any sterilization process wi l l  be a function of the 
entire history of the components that come in. ' I  The Voyager program wil l  depend heavily 
on the development of a qualified reliable sterilizable par ts  list during this latter program. 
Parts selection and qualification must begin immediately (1963) i f  Voyager launch windows 
are to be met. Following selection and qualification of parts,  it  is cri t ical  that all mate- 
rials and processes in the fabrication of Voyager equipment be surveyed and continuously 
monitored. For flight hardware, total reliance must be placed upon procedures in order 
to  assure  requisite reliability and sterilization. The Sterilization Manufacturing Program 
plan outlines this requirement in further detail. 
Although the final assembly contractor is responsible to  NASA for the entire process, a 
tremendous amount of manpower would be expended if  each and every step of every sub- 
contractor operation were to  have a prime contractor inspector check for violations of 
sterility. Subcontractor selection, with respect to the sterility requirement, must be 
undertaken with great care. The prime contractor must institute a motivation and training 
cycle for his subcontractors. This duty would fall on the Sterility Control Group. 
3.10.2 DUTIES 
The Sterility Control Group will provide continuing surveillance of the sterilization 
requirements in the areas of: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Personnel training 
Handling procedures 
Storage requirements 
Certification requirements 
Shipping conditions 
Assembly procedures 
Interface considerations 
Materials selection and acceptance 
Biological testing and certification 
Design review 
Reliability assessment. 
3.10.3 MEMBERSHIP, AUTHORITY, AND CONTROLS 
Professional bioengineering personnel will review each step of the manufacturing process 
for every component, together with the subcontractor personnel. The motivation and 
training of the operation and assembly personnel would be done by the subcontractor for 
his own personnel. Each subcontractor w i l l  appoint a leadman for his own effort. This 
leadman wi l l  become a member of the Sterility Control Group. A member of this group 
wi!1 physically review m d  inspect critical points of the assembly. The prime contractor 
will, where possible, take non-statistical samples and subject them t o  destructive assay 
t o  determine sterility. There is, thus, a requirement for a biological assay laboratory 
on the premises of the prime contractor. 
Authority for approval of processes and procedures must be absolute and rest with the 
Sterility Control Group selected by NASA, biosciences investigators, and the prime con- 
tractor.  It is expected that a bioengineer of the NASA staff would be a permanent member 
of the Control Group. As in any organization, decision making wil l  be at the top level. 
The function of the Sterility Control Group inspectors willnot include the authority to  make 
procedural decisions but is rather restricted to  observing and reporting violations of the 
procedural flow. To reduce costs, the Quality Control inspectors would be given a brief 
course in biological techniques and theory. The Quality Control staff thus becomes the 
working a r m  of the Sterility Control Group. Figure 3.10.3-1 illustrates the suggested 
formulation of the Sterility Control Group. 
3-43 
M 
0 
1 
rn 
k 
0 
0 
a, 
d 
c, 
R 
U I 
4 
I 
c3 
4 
c3 
0 
k 
3 
M 
s;: 
3-44 
- 3.11 MICROBIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
3.11.1 CONCEPT 
Methods for detecting and identifying microbiological contamination are wel l  established 
and documented in the technical literature. 
media and swabbing techniques indicate that conventional methods may not be fully adequate 
for Voyager sterilization. The "seeding" of selected par ts  and components, previously 
mentioned, would utilize spores of relatively rare organisms. Utilizing spores of known 
resistance to thermal sterilization techniques, rapid analysis can be run on par t s  and 
components as a part  of qualification testing. It is felt that only by the use of controlled 
seeding techniques and the subsequent proof of sterilization established by such techniques, 
can prescribed sterilization procedure be verified. U s e  of ther mally-resistant containers 
to contain the par ts  and sterilization of the containers with ethylene oxide after removal 
from the thermal chamber (or in some instances thermal sterilization within the glove box) 
wil l  protect the interior of the component from post-sterilization contamination. 
Difficulties in establishing proper culture 
3.11.2 TECHNIQUE 
Discussion of the specific assay technique must be withheld until a particular trial organism 
is selected and a test par t  chosen. The methods involve destructive testing and the actual 
flight vehicles would not be so assayed. 
The use of protective containers for parts makes possible the bio-assay at a central 
location, Numerous small  laboratories should be avoided. The work of Wilmot-Castle, 
Millipore, J. P. L., and others, is sufficiently detailed in the open and commercial liter- 
ature as to  provide preliminary guidelines for this activity. 
The Sterilization Control Group will review all bio-assay reports. In the event of a posi- 
tive finding, an investigation would be made of all the steps involved in manufacture and 
assembly of the component to  determine how and when contamination occurred. The in- 
vestigation would include a review of the bio-assay and the technique utilized. 
3.11.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future work in this area is a requirement for better biological growth media to develop 
the cultures of heat resistant bacteria. Additional studies to determine "swabbing" tech- 
niques should also be undertaken. The variety of materials involved indicates this wil l  be 
a task of considerable magnitude, 
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3.12 QUALIFICATION 
The Qualification Program discussed in another section of the report  has been predicated 
upon the assumption that functional reliability, as demonstrated by tests performed on 
similar but non-sterilized parts, wi l l  not be degraded by sterilization techniques. 
Pr ior  to functional qualification, every item of hardware in the program wi l l  have been a 
prototype qualified at 145OC for three cycles of 36 hours. Those items in Class I wi l l  be 
qualified a t  the component level for reliability as wel l  as for thermal qualification. Within 
the assembly process they normally would get functional qualification tests. Each com- 
ponent of Class I, I1 and I11 wi l l  be required to withstand an extended ethylene oxide soak 
at operating temperatures. 
to determine the effect of rapid outgassing. 
Rapid pressure drops will be a part of the qualification cycle 
The ethylene oxide qualification shall be done after the vibration, humidity, etc. tes ts  
that normally would ae used with the completed flight vehicle. This qualification shall 
also include sampling techniques to determine sterilization efficiency. The sampling 
techniques would utilize biological "seeding. " 
3.12.1 ETHYLENE OXIDE TEST FACILITY 
The qualification of materials, parts, etc., requires  the acquisition, installation, and 
calibration of a material  tes t  facility capable of performing exposure to ethylene oxide- 
Freon 1 2  mixtures under controlled humidity and temperature environments and wi l l  in- 
clude capability for thermal sterilization in air o r  inert gas. The system w i l l  include: 
a. Test chamber 
b. Temperature programmer - controller recorder 
c. Humidity controller - recorder 
d. Inlet outlet facilities for ethylene oxide and inert gases 
Construction of the chamber wi l l  be stainless steel. The blower motor should be enclosed 
and explosion proof. 
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i. 13 MATERIALS, COMPONENTS & DESIGN 
3.13.1 GENERAL ______ 
Sterilization imposes an additional environmental s t r e s s  on spacecraft materials, which 
must be considered during the design and development stages of the program. Siceriliza- 
tion, as has been discussed is a materials problem in addition to  a biological problem. 
In'ormation on the compatibility of materials, parts, and components with sterilization 
requirements wi l l  provide data in support of a n  approved materials and par ts  list for  
s ter  ilizable spacecraft. 
3.13.2 STERILIZATION EFFECTS ON RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 
A major problem area associated with sterilization is the potential lowering of functional 
reliability. Although reliability may be degraded by sterilization, very little information 
is available on the quantitative effects. Two major a reas  for the determination of such 
effects involve encapsulated electronics and thermal control coatings. Information obtained 
in these areas would a3vance the state of the art associated with sterilization effects and 
would be of considerable benefit to the Voyager Pro, m r  am. 
Some reliability studies of encapsulated electronics and thermal control coatings have 
been performed. These studies, however, have been very limited. The approach to in- 
corporating sterilization effects into reliability testing involves initial property evalua- 
tions of electronic parts, encapsulants, and coatings before and after exposure to steri l iza- 
tion cycles. Pa r t s  and materials a r e  then selected for long-life operational exposure after 
sterilization. Representative electronic modules should be fabricated, sterilized and 
operated under electrical load in thermal-vacuum environment for mission lifetime. 
Thermal control coatings selected after initial sterilization should be exposed to a UV- 
thermal-vacuum environment. Analyses include determination of adhesive strengths and 
surface optical properties. 
Such a n  evaluation of materials and parts w i l l  provide the following information: 
a. Determination of property degradation 
b. Establishment of an approved parts and materials list, with estimates of 
reliability 
c. Definition of cri t ical  materials and parts problem areas.  
This task wil l  involve exposure of various materials and parts to chemical and thermal 
sterilization processes. The materials and par ts  to be selected should be those which 
are expected to be most susceptible to damage, on the basis of present information. Each 
subsystem should be examined for candidate materials and parts. Performance cr i ter ia  
should be evaluated for changes due to sterilization treatments. Tests  include measure- 
ment of physical properties, mechanical tests, thermal radiative properties and metal- 
lographic analyses. Typical materials to be evaluated include: 
a. Adhesives 
b. Solders 
c. Valve seats 
d. O-rings 
e. Diaphragms 
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f. Encapsulants 
g. Honeycomb 
h. Coatings 
i. Insulation 
j .  Heat shield materials 
Based upon the materials and par ts  studies, re-examination of components must be 
undertaken. It would be expected that substitution and replacement of par ts  and materials 
would require re-design of some par ts  in  order to conform to the sterilization and 
assembly flow. Increased reliability, exemplification of the sterilization process, and 
a closer approach to the complete terminal thermal concept would be the goal of this 
effort. 
3.13.3 DAMAGE SENSITIVITY 
Experience developed as a result of reliability physics studies on advanced space re- 
liability projects and as a result of laboratory physical failure analyses on par t s  and 
components through development-product cycles, has lent an insight into the inter-re- 
lationship of load, environment, and time to failure. 
One essential fact is that system failure is a result of physical changes at the level of 
the materials of par t  o r  component construction. These changes may be induced by 
human e r r o r  or  by normal operation. Pre-treatments such as a thermal sterilization 
cycle will have physical effects which i n  many cases  will decrease the life expectancy 
of materials in an engineering application. 
One way of evaluating damage is the concept of thermal equivalency to damage based 
on chemical kinetics. In this approach, the basic Arrhenius rate expression, o r  the 
more recent Theory of Absolute Reaction Rates are used empirically. Failure, as 
defined by a certain value of change, is used for the evaluation of equivalency. Mechanical, 
electrical, and environmental factors are evaluated on the same basis as thermal factors 
in determining end-of-life limits. 
The segregation of i tems into sensitivity categories is a relatively high-risk under- 
taking since so much depends on the application and the function to be performed. Damage, 
in the sense used here, is primarily related to  changes in nominal output, such as re- 
s i s t y c e  changes in  a resistor,  o r  decreases in engineering properties such as relaxa- 
tion in springs or  gaskets. 
The following types of information are required, some of which have been obtained 
during the study phase: 
A. Materials 
Existing materials lists which a r e  available from other programs have been reviewed 
initially, with each material categorized as to  its tolerance to sterilization temperatures 
and ethylene oxide-Freon vapor. No specific problems were found with the ethylene 
oxide-Freon vapor. The results of the temperature compatibility evolution a r e  given 
in Table 3.13.3-1. A s  a more specific Voyager materials list is developed, each 
material  should be categorized Class I, Class  II, o r  Class III. Special attention should 
be paid to plastic films, particularly those of the Polyimide family, which should be 
tested for  their applicability to sterilization resistant seals, and greases,  where a 
selection is required of approved compounds for lubrication of moving par ts  and for  
thermal joints. 
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TABLE 3.13.3-1. MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY WITH STERILIZATION 
(Estimated Compatibility with 145OC, 36 hours) 
Material Yes No Maybe Comments 
ALUMINUM ALLOYS 
1100 X 
2000 series -0 condition 
T6, T8 
X 
3000 series X 
5000 series X 
6000 series -0 condition 
7000 series -0 condition 
T6 
T6 
MAGNESIUM ALLOYS - 
GENERAL 
AZ 81A, ZK60A-T6 
A2 92A, ZH62A 
TITANIUM ALLOYS 
BERYLLIUM ALLOYS 
STEELS. STAINLESS STEELS 
SOLDERS (LEAD-TIN) 
COPPER BASE-Be-Cu 
RUBBERS 
Polysulfide 
Butyls neoprene, acryle - 
nitriles, silicones 
RTV 
Fluorocarbon rubber (Viton) 
ORGANICS 
Thermosetting Resins 
Phenolics , polyesters 
diallyl phthalate, 
aromatic amine, anhydride 
cured epoxies, urea and 
melamine formaldehyde 
Room temperature cured 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Possible overaging, loss of 
About 10 percent loss of strength 
at temperature reversible 
(Same as 3000 series) reversible 
loss of strength of 10-20 percent 
Possible overaging loss of 
X strength 
Overaging, 10 percent loss of 
X .strength 
X 20-50 percent reversible loss 
of strength at 300°F. 
X Approx. 10 percent irreversible 
loss of strength. These alloys 
have extremely low creep 
strength (1000 psi  for 0.2 er- 
cent creep 100 hrs. at 300 F). 
X strength 
g 
X Low creep strength 
X 70-75 percent loss in strength 
at 3000F-reversible 
Depolymerize, be come soupy 
Surface effects (hazy, powdery) 
X Loss in adhesion shear  strength 
17 percent; outgassing 
Discoloration, embrittlement, 
cracking and crazing - soft at 
temperature 
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* TABLE 3.13.3-1. MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY WITH STERILIZATION (Cont'd) 
Material Yes No Maybe C om m e nts 
4 
Room temperature cured 
epoxies - reinforced (glass 
o r  synthetic polymer fabric 
o r  fibers) 
Thermoplastic Resins 
Mylar 
Teflon 
Kel- F 
Nylon, penton, 
lexan (polycarbonate) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X Less strength loss than non- 
reinforced 
X Most, except fluorocarbons, 
soften, flaw, sublime, char 
o r  distort 
X Most types 0. K. Some nylons 
questionable 
Polyethylenes, polypropylene X Soften 
DuPont HT-1 (Polyamide) X 
Polyimide - H film X 
Plasticized types X Loss of plasticizer, outgassing 
(v iny Is) 
Dacron (polyester) 
Delrin 
X 
X 
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TABLE 3.13.3-2. ENTRY/LANDER SUBSYSTEMS 
STRUCTURE AND SHIELD SUBSYSTEM 
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
Water Tank 
Solenoid Valve 
Water Boiler 
He at Exchangers 
Gear Pumps 
Electric Motors 
Squib Valves 
Guillotines 
Check Valves 
Surface Radiators 
Plumbing, Fittings, Tubing 
Accumulators 
Component Surface Plates 
Modulation Valves 
Temperature Controller 
Temperature Sensor 
ELECTRICAL POWER AND DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEM 
Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator 
Battery Charging Regulator 
Battery 
Power Distribution Board 
Power Controller 
Harness 
PROPULSION AND SEPARATION SUBSYSTEM 
Inflight Disconnect 
Explosive Bolts 
Reservoirs 
Squib Valves 
Nozzles 
Retro-rocket 
RETARDATION SUBSYSTEM 
Thermal Battery 
Arming Relay 
Programmers 
Time Delays 
Drogue Mortar 
Parachutes 
Explosive Bolts 
Inflight Disconnect 
Parachute Swivel 
Reefing Line Cutters 
Cut-off Fittings 
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c TABLE 3.13.3-2. ENTRY/LANDER SUBSYSTEMS (Cont'd) 
ORIENTATION SUBSYSTEM 
Impact G Switch 
Arm Relay 
Disarm Relay 
Mercury Switches 
Motion Detector 
Time Delay 
Gear Train Motor 
Deployment Mechanisms 
Electromechanical Actuator 
Tilt  Bar 
Harpoons 
Orientation Rockets 
COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
VHF Transmitter 
S-Band Power Amplifier 
VHF & S-Band Diplexer 
V H F  Receiver 
Command Demodulators 
Antennas 
High Voltage Power Supply 
Transponder 
Command & Computer Subsystem 
Thermoplastic Recorder 
Buffer Storage Unit 
Data Processing Unit 
Vertical Sensor 
Antenna Drive 
SunSensors 
Control Electronics 
S-Band Switch 
Power Conversion & Control Unit 
DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM 
Temperature Sensors 
Accelerometers 
Pressure  Sensors 
Ablation Sensors 
Ablation Converter 
Events Deployment Monitors 
P res su re  Transducers 
Power Supply 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS SUBSYSTEM 
Radar Altimeter 
Panoramic TV Camera 
Sample Gatherer, Drill and Pulverizer 
Seismograph 
Precipitation Detector 
Anemometer 
Surface Hardness Tester 
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TABLE 3.13.3-2. ENTRY/LANDER SUBSYSTEMS (Cont'd) 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS SUBbTSTEM (Cont'd) 
Microphone 
Light Detector 
Temperature Sensors 
Turbidity Detector 
Gamma Ray Back Scatter Densiometer 
Atmospheric Composition Detector (Gas Chromatograph) 
Langmuir Probe 
Radiosotope Detector 
Multiple Chamber Growth Detector 
Photoautotroph 
Microscope 
Pressure Sensors 
Surf ace Moisture 
Surf ace Gravity 
B. Struc tur a1 Design 
The elements which comprise the Entry/Lander's structure shall be investigated for 
sensitivity to differential expansion and thermal growth resulting from heat sterilization. 
A mathematical model shall be used to afford an estimate of the structural  effect which 
results with a controlled heat flow and resultant structural  temperatures. Elements to 
be considered include laminated structures, sandwich panels, honeycomb, and thin shells 
with massive stiffeners. 
C. Parts and Components 
Parts and components which are anticipated for Voyager use shall be reviewed and sterili- 
zation techniques recommended. A compilation based upon the present Entry/Lander 
design is given in Table 3.13.3-2. The items that present difficulties in withstanding the 
sterilization cycle are discussed in the following section. 
3.13.4 SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS 
A. Liquids and Gases 
Liquids and gases are readily sterilized by filtration, utilizing a suitable bacterial filter 
such as Linde's L425 o r  Millipore fi l ter  pads with the Vacudent Company's special filter 
holder. Accordingly, where thermal sterilization results in excessive liquid and gas 
temperatures o r  excessive tankage weight, filtration could be used. 
could then be conducted upon empty tanks, which would be Mer filter-filled affcrdi!xg 
s ter i le  tanks and contents. 
Thermal sterilization 
B. Batteries 
Material considerations indicate that thermal sterilization of batteries is feasible at the 
present time with nickel-cadmium cells. However, the effects upon their operating life 
have not yet been fully established although some testing is in progress. 
Silver oxide-zinc and silver-cadmium batteries are not suitable for thermal sterilization 
in presently available configurations. However, silver-oxide batteries can probably be 
developed for sterilization if sterile assembly techniques are employed and batteries 
are charged after sterilization. Some typical techniques which could be employed are 
l isted in Table 3.13.4-1. 
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Part 
TABLE 3.13.4-1. BATTERY STERILIZATION 
Material Technique - Remarks 
Cathode NiO Thermal o r  
AgaO Radiation 
Anode Zn Thermal 
Cd Thermal 
Electrolyte KOH Filtered Linde L-425 filter 
Separator Nylon 
Cellophane 
Fiberglass 
Substitute DuPont Polyimide- 
thermal sterilization o r  Nylon- 
thermal sterilization 
Structural Parts Plastics Thermal 
Metals Thermal 
Rubber Thermal 
Following the thermal sterilization of parts, assembly shall be effected in a sterile as- 
sembly facility under an ethylene oxide environment. 
C. Parachutes 
DuPont HT-1 is recommended as the most satisfactory parachute fiber for high tempera- 
ture and heavy-duty exposure. Tests have shown that HT-1 retains its strength up to 
600°F, without the marked stiffening which occurs to most nylon materials. The material 
is not yet in large-scale production, although it is available in nominal quantities and 
production is expected to increase in the near future. 
D. Electro-Explosive Devices 
It is not safe to assume that devices are self-sterilizing during operation. Microorganisms 
have been shown to  effectively resist pressures  beyond that to be expected during the 
operation of the devices. Even though the temperatures reach those of sterilization, the 
time element is too short  to effect sterilization of the component and its remnants. If 
an electro-explosive device failed to function and sterility were dependent upon operation, 
impact upon the target would result  in contamination. 
Sterilization is a new field to the explosives and device manufacturer. Several organiza- 
tions are now marketing, o r  preparing to market, devices that are claimed to meet the 
thermal requirements for  sterilization. Reliability data (after thermal soak and an ex- 
tended dormancy period) is inadequate. It is most probable, however, that explosive 
devices can be designed to meet temperature and reliability cri teria,  and for this reasen 
it is recommended that such devices be used throughout the Voyager system wherever 
good design practice and weight trade-offs indicate their use. 
Due to the large number of tests required for statistical reliability verification, the re- 
quirement for real-time dormancy surveillance studies and the lead t imes required for 
any new design and development, a program to design and qualify explosives and de- 
vices should be started immediately. 
E. Propellants 
Sterilization by thermal methods is possible for propellants used on the Lander vehicles. 
It is the recommended solution for Voyager. It is additionally possible, as demonstrated 
by work at JPL,  to introduce ethylene oxide into the propellant during manufacture (6 
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- percent by weight) without cri t ical  loss of impulse. The construction of a sterilizable 
rocket, propellant and casing has not been completed and tested but J P L  is currently 
studying i t s  production. 
9 
Sterilization by thermal methods involves safety considerations, physical shrinkage and 
chemical change possibilities. Based upon present development, it is planned to have 
the rocket attached to the Lander at the time of final thermal treatment. Due to the ad- 
visability of sterilizing the Lander-Orbiter interface at the time of heat treatment, it 
would be extremely difficult to have a steri le assembly of the large Lander rocket follow- 
ing the thermal chamber treatment. 
The question of safety must be resolved by means of full qualification testing. It is 
certain that range safety officers and plant safety officials wil l  not allow propellants to 
be heated unless they have full possession of data indicating that no hazard is present. 
The safety area represents a large consideration in the GSE planning and equipment flow. 
F. Heat Shield 
Existing data on G .  E. ' s  re-entry heat shield materials indicate that Phenolic nylon is 
marginal for thermal sterilization at 145OC. Accordingly, use is contemplated of the 
modified silicone foams, designated ESM-1000 series materials. These latter are suit- 
able for continuous use at 300°F. 
3.13.5 SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT 
The scientific payload, like other Lander equipment, requires sterilization. Accordingly, 
the estimated suitability of each experiment to sterilization s t resses  is tabulated in 
Table 3.13.5-1. 
TABLE 3.13.5-1. SCIENTIFIC PAYLOAD SUITABILITY TO STERILIZATION 
REQUIRING 
135OC DRY ETHYLENE 145OC MODULARIZA- 
SCIENTIFIC PAY LOAD HEAT CYCLE OXIDE CYCLE - CYCLES TION 
Temperature 
P r e s  su r  e 
Density 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK OK NO 
OK OK NO 
OK OK NO 
Gas Chromatograph YES 
Radar Altimeter OK OK OK NO 
Television OK NO YES 
Insulation OK OK OK YES 
Anemometer OK OK OK NO 
Radioisotope Detector 
Turbidity & PH 
(Growth Det. ) 
OK 
Multiple Chamber Biochem. NO 
Photoautotroph NO 
Petrographic Microscope 
Seismograph OK 
Langmuir Probe OK 
NO 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK YES 
NO YES 
NO YES 
NO YES 
NO NO 
OK NO 
OK 
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TABLE 3.13.5-1. SCIENTIFIC PAYLOAD SUITABILITY TO STERILIZATION (Cont'd. ) 
SCIENTIFIC PAY LOAD 
Microphone 
Soil Moisture* 
Surface Hardness Tester  
Gravity 
Precipitation Detector 
Sample Gatherer (Drill) 
Pulv er iz e r 
Bolts, nuts and hardware 
Harness Cabling 
Diagnostic Instrumentation 
Ablation Sensor 
Temperature Sensors 
Accelerometers 
Ablation Converter 
*With dry ethylene, YES 
REQUIRING 
135OC DRY ETHYLENE 145OC MODULARIZA- 
HEAT CYCLE OXIDE CYCLE CYCLES TION 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
NO 
NO YES 
OK OK NO 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
OK 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
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3.14 HUMAN FACTORS 
It has been assumed throughout this sterilization study that human e r r o r  plays no role 
while in fact the successful conduct of this phase of the Voyager program depends ulti- 
mately on meticulous human attention to detail, the scrupulous observation of procedures 
and a high level of motivation and dedication t o  the sterilization concept. In many ways, 
the problem of sterilization parallels the problem of reliability. It cuts across  all lines 
and is a major design principle. 
The application of human factor principles to problems such as reliability and other 
areas of specialized manufacture and assembly have indicated personnel problems in 
selection and training of the individuals involved. They have indicated the role of reward 
and special working conditions on productivity and adherence to  procedures. 
An element of some importance in the conduct of the Voyager program will be the careful 
study of the human engineering aspects of manufacture, assembly, and tes t  as well as the 
complex operations at the launch site and the development of general and detailed training 
programs tailored to the requirements of the particular individuals and their job responsi- 
bilities. Human factors personnel will play an  important role in the development and 
standardization of procedures designed t o  assume the high level of personnel performance 
required for program success. 
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SECTION 4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 CONCLUSIONS 
A biologically steri le spacecraft is technologically feasible and within the state of the a r t  
expected by 1967. There are a substantial number of areas where intensive effort must 
be concentrated i f  hardware reality is to be attained within this time period. A complete 
thermal sterilization for Voyager with its present mission could not be done with com- 
ponents available today; however, i f  the recommended development programs a re  carried 
out successfully, thermal sterilization, as outlined in the report, is possible. If unsuc- 
cessful, it is doubtful i f  the assembled vehicle in a protective barr ier  can be completely 
terminally heat sterilized. The presence of liquids, gases,  radio-active power supplies, 
requirements for late assembly of explosives and practical handling difficulties indicates 
that some post-thermal treatment steri le assembly may be required. Studies to this end 
should also be undertaken. 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.2.1 STERILIZATION TECHNOLOGY 
It is recommended that: 
A. Clean Rooms be Class 10,000. To effect organism load reduction, soil and 
dust must be excluded. Class 10,000 affords a practical state-of-the-art 
solution. 
B. Ail par ts  be handled, shipped and stored in biological protective containers. 
The theory of biological load reduction at various stages of manufacture 
and hardware assembly require a controlled product at all stages. Additive 
sterilization techniques increase the likelihood of an aseptic end product. 
C. Microbiological assay procedures be conducted by a single laboratory. 
Microbiological assays a r e  only valid when procedural changes are limited 
and techniques identical. The best assurance of this is t o  have the same 
group do all work. 
Methods, techniques, and reliability of biological seeding be investigated. 
Present studies have been aimed at determination of the problem. These 
techniques do not indicate that the most efficient or  reliable method of micro- 
biological assay of space components have been attained. Methods useful for 
determination of gross contamination may give misleading information when 
1 x 
D. 
contamination probability is being tested. 
E. The studies of the combined effects of different sterilization techniques 
be extended. Firm data 2s t~ the &!itive, multiplicative or  non-effective 
end results of combining different sterilization techniques is not available. 
Firm data may lead to  substantial cost reduction for the vehicle. 
The parameters and reliability of ethylene oxide sterilization be further 
investigated. There is insufficient data to judge the steri le assembly tech- 
nique. 
F. 
4.2.2 MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY 
It is recommended that: 
A. The expansion of the materials and components classification system be 
undertaken a t  once. To eliminate Class I1 and Ill from the sterilization 
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program, it is imperative that materials, components, and potential sub- 
stitutes be identified with respect to  their thermal characteristics. 
B. The construction of a materials-test facility, capable of handling ethylene 
oxide under varying conditions of humidity and temperature be undertaken. 
Spacecraft materials in general have not been tested with ethylene oxide. 
Estimates of material durability have been mainly derived by analogy with 
the reactions of ethylene oxide on medical supplies. 
information upon which to base a final design. Facilities designed for space- 
craft are as yet non-existent. 
This is not good enough 
C. Studies on encapsulated electronics and thermal-control coatings be ex- 
tended. The extent and present rate of progress in this area will not pro- 
duce required information within the t ime limits set for Voyager design. 
The studies have shown enough progress t o  make it worthwhile t o  go deeper. 
4.2.3 COMPONENT TECHNOLOGY 
It is recommended that: 
A. Class II items be modularized to facilitate steri le assembly when required. 
To  insure that the terminal heat sterilization is effective, a low organism 
load is required. Sterile assembly and protection of the steri le package by 
modularization would permit more confidence in the terminal heating process. 
Bo A l ist  of space qualified (for sterility and reliability) components be assem- 
bled for  design use. When design can be done using known factors, cost goes 
down and reliability increases. Such a l ist  will pinpoint areas and components 
where further research is required. 
An electro-explosive device and propellant sterilization study, with attention 
t o  reliability and safety, be initiated. Reliable data in this a r e a  is practical- 
ly nonexistent. 
ments can be met, but specific devices, suitable for flight, cannot be 
identified. Requirements for real-time testing make an immediate start on 
this problem very important 
C. 
Parametric studies indicate that all sterilization require- 
4.2.4 OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that: 
A. A human factors and motivation study be undertaken to determine the best 
method of indoctrinating manufacturing and assembly personnel with sterility 
concepts. Evaluation of the work accomplished under the Minuteman par ts  
program and rnoiivaticjri stiidics provide a valimhle base for this investigation. 
B. Efforts to eliminate Class 111 components and scientific equipment via design 
be intensified. 
C. Terminal thermal sterilization be done at  a field site, Difficulties in trans- 
porting, testing and assaying a steri le vehicle indicate that reliability and 
steri le integrity can be attained by terminal sterilization late in the factory- 
to- launch sequence. 
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APPENDIX A. ORBITER STERILIZATION OF MARS 1973 VOYAGER 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The orbit which is proposed for the Mars  1973 mission necessitates the Orbiter's being 
sterilized. The plan which had been developed for the Lander will be applied to the 
Orbiter -Lander as a combination, with the sterile interface transposed from the Orbiter - 
Lander to the Booster-Orbiter. 
A- 1 
2. EQUIPMENT STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
2.1 ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
Thermal sterilization of electronic equipment wil l  be afforded with the use of par ts  from 
the Approved Par t s  List. When Class I1 items must be utilized for their particular 
functions, the bacterial load shall be reduced with the gaseous sterillant, ethylene oxide- 
freon enabling the thermal sterilization t o  be effective at 135OC. 
Microelectronics and the tape recorder can be designed to be thermally sterilizable 
with no significant reliability degradation by utilizing thermally stable materials (Recom- 
mended Materials List) in conjunction with a compatible design. 
Plastic Recording for the tape recorder which of necessity utilizes a high temperature 
film coating on glass plates. 
For example, Thermal 
Vidicon and image orthicon tubes are expected to require special development efforts to 
enable thermal sterilization. Weaknesses in these result from the light sensitive materials 
which generally a r e  thermally sensitive. Accordingly, efforts in this area would be 
directed a t  the develogment of suitable, high temperature, photo-conductive coatings. 
2,2 PROPULSION AND THRUST VECTOR CONTROL 
The propellant and oxidizer of the Orbiter engine is hydrazine and either nitrogen tetroxide 
or  IRFNA. The latter (N~Hq-Nz04) is not thermally sterilizable and requires bacterial 
filtration. The other combination is thermally sterilizeable, however, with little tankage 
weight penalty. 
Secondary injection or gimbaling is used for thrust  vector control. The particular choice 
is dependent upon the dynamics of the guidance control loop which is still being studied. 
Sterilization for either system is readily accomplished. An hydraulic actuating system is 
thermally sterilizable, while the secondary injection fluids can be filtered. 
2 . 3  MECHANICAL AND ELECTROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT 
The mechanical and electromechanical equipment sterilization approach will be analogous 
to  that used for electronic equipment, included in the Approved Parts List. Mechanical 
and electro-mechanical equipment's sterilization depends upon the use of materials from 
a Recommended Materials List. These lists are application oriented, incorporating all 
the information required to  describe limiting materials'  properties pertinent t o  thermal 
sterilization. 
Undoubtedly difficulties wil l  become apparent in that some desired components incorporate 
materials which are not suitable for thermal sterilization. This in turn wil l  necessitate 
development, for a substitute material, part or component. A list of proposed components 
for this vehicle is shown as Table A-i .  The eoriipnents have heen examined to determine 
major problems specifically applicable to the 1973 Orbiter. 
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